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Abstract
In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its
market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-
cost producers, notably US shale oil, out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil
prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple
equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors that can rationalize
such a regime switch by OPEC. These include: (i) the growth of US shale oil
production; (ii) the slowdown of global oil demand; (iii) reduced cohesiveness of the
OPEC cartel; (iv) production ramp-ups in other non-OPEC countries. We show
that these qualitative predictions are broadly consistent with oil market developments
during 2014-15. The model is calibrated to oil market data; it predicts accommodation
up to 2014 and a market-share strategy thereafter, and explains large oil-price swings
as well as realistically high levels of OPEC output.
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1 Introduction
In 2014, global oil supply overtook demand and the oil price started to decline. In its
November 2014 meeting, OPEC1 decided not to reduce supply and prices fell further.
Many oil-market analysts interpreted this as the formal decision to squeeze higher-cost
US shale oil production back out of the market. It also stood in contrast with OPECs
coordinated cut during the Global Financial Crisis and Saudi Arabias role as a swing
producer, which seeks to accommodate changes in demand or production by other players.
A former adviser to Saudi Arabias Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi summarized: His biggest
move was the latest one of defending Saudi market share, and abandoning the OPEC
swing role.2
OPECs actions occurred against the backdrop of weakening global demand for crude,
and several years of steadily rising capacity from non-OPEC sources most notably from
unconventional sources in the US. Since mid-2014, the oil price fell from above $100 to
an average of $50 during 2015. In its December 2015 meeting, OPEC reiterated its com-
mitment to a market-sharestrategy. Many have opined on whether OPEC is taking a
sensible perspective by driving competitors out of business or whether it is a misguided
move tantamount to hara-kiri.3
Our goal in this paper is to understand the fundamental market factors that induced
the shift in OPECs strategy. We present a simple economic model of the oil market:
OPEC has a degree of market power and competes against a set of non-OPEC producers
who act as a price-taking competitive fringe.4 OPEC has a choice between two strategies.
The rst strategy, which we call accommodate, is to maximize prots via a highoil
price which allows the high-cost non-OPEC producers to remain protable. The second
strategy, referred to as squeeze, is to drive up production and hence drive down price
and thereby induce high-cost producers, specically US shale oil, to exit the market. We
show that either of these two strategies can be optimal for OPEC depending on market
fundamentals on demand and supply.
Our theory shows that the market-share strategy becomes relatively more attractive
for OPEC under these conditions: (i) slower global oil demand; (ii) greater US shale oil
production; (iii) reduced cohesiveness within OPEC; and (iv) higher output in other non-
1As at the end of 2015, the members of The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
are (in order of crude oil capacity for 2015): Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Indonesia, Qatar, Ecuador, and Libya, although Libyas capacity is
at present highly constrained by its security situation. This amounts to cumulative production capacity
of 35 1
2
mbd. Actual crude (31 1
2
mbd) and NGL (6 1
2
mbd) output exceeded 40% of global demand in 2015.
2Quoted in Wall Street Journal (4 June 2015) Saudi Arabias Celebrity Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi
Prepares for Potential OPEC Swan Song.
3 Ise (1926) quoted in Yergin (2008).
4Although Saudi Arabia is the dominant player in OPEC, we refer to the broader group as a collective.
Saudi Arabia has accounted for the bulk of OPEC adjustment when responding to moderate changes in
the oil market, but large adjustments in OPEC output have included participation from multiple parties,
including collective cuts during the Global Financial Crisis and some increases in output during the recovery
and in response to supply outages during the Arab Spring. In addition, a lot of recent growth in OPEC
capacity and output has come from Iraq, representing the choice of Iraq to produce more and of other
members not to keep collective OPEC output constant.
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OPEC countries. We show that a regime switch from accommodate to squeeze becomes
optimal when US shale oil grows beyond a specic point. The model can rationalize
OPECs decision to raise output in the face of weaker demand, and explain a large drop
in the oil price. We provide formal results and economic intuition in the main text.
In the empirical part of the paper, we begin with a description of oil-market devel-
opments which highlight how the models comparative-statics are pertinent. We give an
account of OPECs strategy shift and the market responses of non-OPEC players. We
then calibrate the model to oil5 market data across a range of scenarios. First, we show
how the model rationalizes the oil market in the period preceding the price collapse as
a high-price accommodate scenario where OPEC chooses not to squeeze US shale oil
despite already substantial market-share erosion and having su¢ cient spare capacity for
a squeeze. Second, to illustrate selected comparative statics, we show how some parame-
ter changes can prompt a rational decision by OPEC to squeeze US shale oil out of the
market. Third, we show that the model generates squeeze equilibria when calibrated to
forecasts of future data that yield higher OPEC output and lower prices.
Our model exposes the fallacy of interpreting a fall in OPECs revenues or prot as
evidence that a market-strategy is necessarily misguided. The simple point is that the
relevant comparison is not how prots compare to an earlier period, but rather how they
would compare to pursuing a di¤erent strategy today for which prots could be even
lower. By showing how a market-share strategy can be optimal for OPEC in a formal
framework, we o¤er the model as a potential rational economic explanation for the 2014
switch in OPECs strategy and the subsequent oil price crash. However, we do not wish
to claim that it is the most likely of a range of possible economic or political motivators.6
Our theory makes a number of simplifying assumptions. The model is static and
partial-equilibrium; it does not explicitly incorporate dynamics such as a producers in-
tertemporal decision to sell today or leave the oil in the ground.7 Relatedly, the model
does not feature inventory behaviour although we do account for this in the empirical
part of the paper. We also do not address the potential roles of uncertainty and asym-
metric information. Finally, the production of non-OPEC players is modelled as a binary
decision: they produce up to capacity if price exceeds their cost, and otherwise shut down.
The market-share strategy is premised on OPEC having low costs and US shale
having high costs.8 US shale almost surely has higher costs than OPEC, yet are the
5Unless crude is specically mentioned, oil refers to liquids, namely crude oil and natural gas liquids
(NGLs) as these are very close substitutes. The IEA does not distinguish between the two when reporting
demand or non-OPEC supply. For OPEC, these are separated out by the IEA in part because NGLs
are not formally part of OPECs quota. Gas, whether natural gas or associated gas generated from the
production of liquids, is excluded.
6As argued by Fattouh, Poudine and Sen (2015) for Saudi Arabia, many OPEC countries remain highly
undiversied and hence highly reliant on oil for meeting domestic spending pressures, making revenue the
prime consideration.
7The Hotelling rule is well-known to have little empirical explanatory power. Cairns and Calfucura
(2012) argue it is only relevant for producers with a limited resource horizon, which is not the case for the
large oil producers.
8[The policy to defend market share] is also a defense of high e¢ ciency producing countries, not only of
market share. We want to tell the world that high e¢ ciency producing countries are the ones that deserve
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worlds highest only over a given time frame. Conventional oil extraction entails large
upfront sunk costs but low subsequent marginal variable costs. As a result, it would take
extremely low prices to induce exit from high long-run costconventional resources such
as the Canadian oil sands.9 The US shale life-cycle is much shorter, which makes the
US supply response to prices quicker and the main focus of oil-market analysts. Our
static models marginal costs include upfront expenses for US shale but exclude initial
investments for other producers. In our empirical work, we consider a wide range of cost
parameters for US shale in light of the considerable variation in cost estimates. A number
of conventional producers have sustained current production but reduced investment in
future capacity, which suggests they will also be squeezed over a longer time horizon (IEA,
2016; Toews and Naumov, 2016).
Related literature. Although there has been a lot of policy-related discussion since
November 2014, we believe ours is at the forefront of papers beginning to o¤er a formal
economic model of OPECs strategy shift and its repercussions. Fattouh, Poudineh and
Sen (2015) analyze the trade-o¤s between a strategy of market share and one of curtailing
output to generate near-term revenue. Introducing uncertainty about the nature of US
shale tends to favor accommodation but, as further information reduces this uncertainty,
a switch in strategy becomes more likely.10
There are a number of analyses of the oil price crash; for discussions of its causes
and implications see, for example, Arezki and Blanchard (2014), Hussain et al. (2015),
Baumeister and Killian (2015), Hamilton (2015), and Mohaddes and Raissi (2016). Many
suggest that supply-side factors have been more important in explaining the oil price
crash than demand factors.11 Smith (2009) demonstrates how the combination of low
demand and supply elasticities in the oil market can account for historical levels of oil
price volatility without any role for any volatility-enhancing nancial speculation. Our
results show how an oil price decline induced by weaker demand or an exogenous rise in
supply can be magnied because it induces a regime switch in OPEC behaviour and an
endogenous increase in supply. In a similar vein, Verleger (2016) emphasizes how market
structure plays a vital role in understanding oil price movements.
There remains considerable debate on the extent to which OPEC members cooperate
(Smith, 2005; Bremond, Hache, and Mignon, 2012; Nakov and Nuno, 2013; Huppmann,
2013). Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2011) suggest that OPECs behaviour is a mix
market share. That is the operative principle in all capitalist countries.Minister Al-Naimi, Middle East
Economic Survey Interview, 21 December 2014.
9Mabro (1998) suggests a market-share strategy is not sensible: since conventional oil producers tradi-
tionally have operating costs that are well below prevailing prices, it would take too large price decline to
induce their exit. Our analysis revisits this issue with a more formal economic framework geared towards
the distinction between conventional and unconventional oil production.
10They also note that OPEC allowing for more price volatility introduces uncertainty for prospective
entrants and can discourage entry as a result.
11Although the relative importance of each factor is di¢ cult to pin down, OPECs renouncement of price
support and rapid expansion of oil supply from unconventional sources appear to have played a crucial role
since mid-2014. Empirical estimates also indicate that supply (more than demand) factors have accounted
for the lions share of the plunge in oil prices (Ba¤es et al, 2015; Beidas-Strom and Osorio-Buitron, 2015).
4
of near-collusive episodes and subsequent non-cooperative breakdowns. Huppmann and
Holz (2012) nd that OPECs degree of market power has declined in recent years, and
Fattouh and Mahadeva (2013) attribute uctuations in this power to market conditions.
The approach we take is exible in that we calibrate OPECs degree of market power to
t the data across each of our scenarios. In this way, we obtain a set of parameters which
describe the level of competition in the market and are broadly in line with those from
the prior empirical literature. Pricing regimes fall short of a perfect cartel but still allow
low-cost producers (OPEC and non-OPEC) to earn rents. Our accommodate strategy also
has OPEC o¤set other producersproduction changes, and our squeeze strategy has some
similarity with Stackelberg behaviour (Huppmann, 2013). OPECs decision between these
strategies is inuenced by its time-varying ability to coordinate and its market-dependent
choice means that its market power is endogenous. Complementing the longer-term views
in the existing literature, we focus on market developments since 2014.
The squeeze strategy pursued by OPEC against US shale oil in our model is a form of
limit pricing; see Tirole (1988, Chapter 9) for an overview of the industrial-organization
theory literature.12 In related work, Andrade de Sá and Daubanes (2014) suggest that
OPEC prices out of the market any backstop technologywhich has large potential to
erode oil demand. Their main focus is on how this behaviour di¤ers from a Hotelling rule
and the implications for carbon-tax design tax.
Plan for the paper. Section 2 sets up our model of the oil market, and analyses the
equilibrium outcomes under accommodateand squeeze. Section 3 presents the com-
parative statics that favour a regime switch, and a testable condition on when it occurs.
Section 4 argues that the comparative-statics predictions from the model are consistent
with market experience. Section 5 presents our quantitative calibration of the model to
oil market data over a range of scenarios. Section 6 concludes.
2 A simple equilibrium model of the oil market
2.1 Setup of the model
We assume that the global demand curve for oil takes the linear form D(P ) = ( P )=,
with parameters ;  > 0. This is a common assumption in the literature, and will
facilitate empirical calibration of the model later on.
On the supply side, there are N + 1 oil producers, namely OPEC, denoted as i, plus
N other non-OPEC players. OPEC has production capacity Ki with a marginal cost
of production of Ci. Of the other producers, player n 2 N has capacity Kn and unit
12Classic limit-pricing theory relies on the incumbent player raising price again following the exit of the
weaker entrant. Under perfect information, this leads to a credibility problem: the entrant realizes that
price will go back up (making re-entry protable), so cannot be induced to exit in the rst place. Thus limit
pricing does not work without the addition of another market imperfection such as asymmetric information
(which allows the incumbent to build a tough reputation by pricing low). By contrast, we show that
OPECs prots under the squeeze strategy can be permanently higher than under accommodate despite
a (much) lower oil price and without requiring a subsequent harvestingperiod with again-higher prices.
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cost Cn; it is a price-taker which sells up to capacity if P > Cn and zero otherwise. Let
Cj  maxn2NfCng > Ci denote the player j with the highest unit cost, and capacity Kj .
In the present analysis, we take this to be US shale oil. Let K` 
P
n2NnfjgKn denote
the combined production capacity of all other non-OPEC players. Note that the setup
implies that all non-OPEC players produce up to capacity whenever US shale oil does so
(but not necessarily vice versa).
OPEC has market power and can choose between two strategies:
1. Accommodate: Maximizing its prots taking as given that US shale oil produces
up to its capacity level Kj ;
2. Squeeze: Lowering the market price to Cj , thus squeezing US shale oil out of the
market.
The rst of these corresponds to what is often called a price strategy whilst the
second is about market share. Our main question is, which of these two strategies is
more protable for OPEC?
In practice, OPEC is not an e¢ cient cartel: its internal ability to restrict output
has fallen short of what monopoly pricing would require. To capture this, we introduce a
parameter  2 (0; 1] as a reduced form of OPECs pricing power under the accommodation
strategy. The case with  = 1 corresponds to a fully-e¢ cient cartel facing a competitive
fringe; lower values of  represent weaker pricing power.13 As will become clear, our theory
does not hinge on the precise value of , but this parameter plays an important role in
the calibration exercise later on.
2.2 Analysis of the strategies
We begin by deriving OPECs prots under each of the two strategies. Two assumptions
on parameter values are made:
A1. (Cj   Ci) < [(  Cj)  (Kj +K`)]
A2. (  Cj)  (Ki +K`)
The rst assumption ensures that US shale oil (player j) is viable under the accommo-
dation strategy. It implies that all other non-OPEC producers are also viable, and
that OPEC is too (since they all have lower costs); in particular, note that  can-
not be too small. The second assumption ensures that OPEC has su¢ cient capacity
to be able to carry out the squeeze strategy. Note that A1 and A2 together im-
ply (Cj   Ci) <  [(  Cj)  (Kj +K`)]  (Ki   Kj), so that OPEC has signi-
cantly higher production capacity than US shale, specically Ki > Kj + (Cj   Ci)=,
with Cj > Ci. We verify that these parameter assumptions are satised in the empirical
calibration of the model.
13Lower pricing may also be the result of dynamic considerations which we do not model explicitly here,
or because some domestic OPEC stakeholders wish to maximize revenue rather than prots.
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2.2.1 Strategy 1: Accommodate
Since OPEC is the only strategic player it can equivalently choose price or its output level
to maximize its prots given that by A2 it always has su¢ cient capacity Ki. OPEC
faces residual demand fD(P ) Kj  K`g and thus chooses price to:
max
P
i(P )  fD(P ) Kj  K`g (P   Ci)
=
1

f(  P )  (Kj +K`)g (P   Ci).
As noted above, the parameter  2 (0; 1] captures how e¤ective OPEC is at raising price.
We thus write the rst-order condition as 0 = f [(  P )  (Kj +K`)]  (P   Ci)g.
The parameter  captures the weight received by the inframarginal units of production,
[(  P )  (Kj +K`)], relative to the marginal unit on which OPEC earns a margin of
(P   Ci). So the optimalprice for OPEC equals
P  =
Ci + [  (Kj +K`)]
(1 + )
. (1)
This price declines with lower values of , and falls towards is marginal cost Ci as ! 0.14
However, our assumption A1 is equivalent to  being su¢ ciently high such that P  > Cj ,
so that US shale is viable. (Note also that [   (Kj + K`)] > 0 by A1.) The price P 
also falls continuously with higher non-OPEC production, Kj + K`. The corresponding
production level for OPEC is given by:
Si  fD(P ) Kj  K`g
=
1

f[  (Kj +K`)]  P g = [  (Kj +K`)  Ci]
(1 + )
. (2)
So OPEC optimally absorbs higher production capacity of non-OPEC players, Kj + K`,
at a rate of [100=(1 + )]%, that is, dSi =d(Kj + K`) =  1=(1 + ). Since  2 (0; 1], this
rate is at least 50% and rises towards 100% as  falls, that is, as OPEC becomes less
e¤ective as raising price. In this sense, OPEC here acts as a swing producer: for  = 1,
it behaves like a textbook Stackelberg leader and accommodates 50 percent of any change
in non-OPEC production; for ! 0, it almost fully accommodates changes in non-OPEC
production.
It follows that OPECs prots under this strategy are:
i = S

i (P
   Ci) = 


(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)
(1 + )
2
. (3)
The prots of non-OPEC player n 2 N , which produces Kn by construction, are simply
equal to Kn(P    Cn), and are positive by A1.
14 It is easy to check that the second-order condition is satised for any  > 0.
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2.2.2 Strategy 2: Squeeze
Here the price P  = Cj by denition, and OPEC can again equivalently choose this price
or the corresponding output level. This implies that US shale oil (player j) sells zero
while all other non-OPEC players still produce up to a combined capacity of K` (given
their individual costs are each below Cj). The corresponding total market output satises
D(P ) = (  Cj)=, from which it follows that OPECs sales are market output net of
remaining non-OPEC production
Si  fD(P ) K`g =
(  Cj)

 K`. (4)
By A2, there is su¢ cient capacity for this level of sales, i.e., Si  fD(P ) K`g  Ki.
Thus OPECs prots under this strategy are:
i = S

i (P
   Ci) = 1

[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci). (5)
Thus OPECs prots under the squeeze do not depend on the  parameter which captures
its pricing power under the previous accommodate strategy. The prots of non-OPEC
player n 2 Nnfjg areKn(P  Cn), and are positive since Cj  maxn2NfCng = P  > Cn
for all n 2 Nnfjg.
3 Model results
We now turn to our main results on the di¤erent market factors which can lead to a
regime switchunder which OPEC nds it optimal to squeeze US shale.
The preceding analysis already pins down the di¤erence in prots between the two
strategies, i  (i  i ). Here we begin with some comparative statics on which
market factors lead to a rise in i, and then obtain a quantitative result on when
i > 0, i.e., the squeeze becomes preferred from OPECs viewpoint.
Proposition 1 The squeezestrategy becomes relatively more attractive compared to the
accommodatestrategy, in that it o¤ers relatively higher prots (that is, higher i), for
OPEC under the following conditions:
(i) the production capacity of US shale oil Kj is larger;
(ii) the internal cohesiveness of OPEC  is lower;
(iii) the global demand for crude oil  is lower;
(iv) the marginal cost of US shale oil Cj is higher;
(v) the production capacity of other non-OPEC players K` is larger.
The comparative statics from Proposition 1 are intuitive. First, larger US shale oil
production depresses price under the accommodation strategy but its production is zero
by construction under the squeeze strategy, regardless of capacity. This makes squeezing
more shale out of the market look relatively more attractive to OPEC.
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Similarly, if OPEC is less internally cohesive, then it cannot raise price as strongly
and extract as much prot under accommodation. Under the squeeze, the degree of price
coordination is not a factor so this again favours the squeeze strategy.
Third, weaker global demand for crude depresses prots under both the accommodate
and the squeeze strategies. The di¤erence is that, under accommodation, lower demand
reduces both OPECs sales and its prot margin. By contrast, under the squeeze, lower
demand only reduces sales since the price is pinned down by the marginal cost of the
squeezed-out player. Thus lower demand relatively favours the squeeze strategy.15
Fourth, higher costs of US shale oil have no impact on the accommodate equilibrium
from OPECs viewpoint: since US shale remains viable by A1, and produces up to ca-
pacity, higher costs simply mean less prots for US shale oil but no change in the market
equilibrium. However, the squeeze strategy becomes more attractive as less of a price
decline is needed to squeeze US shale out of the market.
Finally, higher production by other non-OPEC players also makes the squeeze relatively
more attractive. Similar to the demand e¤ect, this reduces both price and OPEC sales
under accommodate but solely its sales under the squeeze strategy.
Proposition 1 delivers a clean set of qualitative all-else-equal results which can be
taken to the data. In practice, many of these market factors global demand patterns,
oil production capacities and costs, OPECs internal dynamics change simultaneously.
Our empirical analysis in Sections 4 and 5 therefore considers the evolution of all of these
market factors together.
The comparison of prots between the two strategies leads to the following quantitative
prediction:
Proposition 2 OPEC prefers the squeeze strategy (that is, i > 0) whenever the pro-
duction capacity of US shale oil is su¢ ciently large,
Kj >
"
1

 
(  Ci)  (1 + )
r
1

[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci)
!
 K`
#
 Kj
and otherwise accommodates if Kj  Kj. At this regime switch, the oil price falls
discontinuously from P (Kj) = Ci +
p
(1=) [(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci) to P  = Cj.
Put simply, it is a protable strategy for OPEC to squeeze out a rival selling Kj units
at cost Cj whenever the prizeis su¢ ciently large in that Kj > Kj . Under this condition,
the subsequent gain in market share outweighs the fall in price.
15The industrial-organization literature on collusion comes to conicting views on how the cycle a¤ects
the stability of price coordination (Tirole, 1988: Chapter 6). On one hand, there is a greater short-term
temptation to cheat when demand is high; equilibrium prices are thus lower in booms in order to limit
this incentive to cheat. On the other hand, with imperfect observability of actions, rms cannot perfectly
distinguish between rivals cheating and low demand; thus price wars are more likely during busts. Similarly,
the incentive to deviate is typically stronger when future demand is falling. Our model results are consistent
with the latter perspective.
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Proposition 2 thus delivers a critical value Kj for US shale oil production capacity
which determines which of the two strategies is optimal for OPEC. This critical value
depends on demand and cost conditions as well as other non-OPEC playersproduction
capacities. It lends itself to quantitative empirical testing, which we pursue in Section 5.
We stress that the optimality of the market-share strategy does not rely on a subse-
quent harvestingperiod with again-higher prices after the high-cost players have been
squeezed out of the market.
We thus obtain a further result on how OPEC supply following a regime switch:
Proposition 3 (i) Suppose that an increase in US shale capacity, from K 0j  Kj to
K 0j > Kj, induces a regime switch from accommodate to squeeze. This leads to an increase
in OPECs production, Si > S

i .
(ii) Suppose that a decline in global oil demand, from 0 to 00, induces to a regime switch
from accommodate to squeeze, that is, Kj  Kj(0) but Kj > Kj(00). This leads to an
increase in OPECs production, Si > S

i , as long as the demand decline   (0 00) <
[f[(00   Cj)  (Kj +K`)]  (Cj   Ci)g+ (1 + )Kj ] is not too large.
Proposition 3 is of interest because it shows how OPECs optimal supply responses can
take an unexpected form. Standard intuition from economic theory, as well as the usual
logic around the behaviour of a swing producer, suggest that higher rival output and
lower demand should prompt a softresponse in form of lower OPEC supply. While this
is true within an accommodate strategy, the situation is di¤erent if these market factors
induce a regime switch. Then higher US shale production can induce a ghting response
from OPEC, and the optimal response to lower demand can be to produce more.
Numerical example. A simple numerical example illustrates the workings of the model.
Let the demand conditions  = 250,  = 1 and on the supply side let Ci = 0, Cj =
50 as well as  = 1 and suppose that all players except i,j are inactive, i.e., K` 
0. Our parameter conditions A1 and A2 then boil down to Ki  200 and Kj < 150.
Using Proposition 2, it is easy to check that the critical Kj = 50 and the corresponding
price P (Kj) = 100. Imagine now that player js Kj gradually grows from zero; the
price gradually falls from P (0) = 125 to P (Kj) = 100 using (1), at which point there
is a regime switch and the price crashes to P  = 50 as i squeezes j back out of the
market. In terms of supply, OPEC initially produces Si = (125   12Kj)  125 under
accommodation, and hence o¤sets growing Kj at a rate of 50%. Upon reaching Kj , the
squeeze requires OPECs production to jump to Si = 200, by Proposition 3(i), for
which spare capacity is available as per A1. To check that OPECindeed makes higher
prots, observe that prots under accommodation i = (125  12Kj)2  15,625 using (3)
while under the squeeze i = S

i P
 = 200  50 = 10,000 using (5). It is easy to see
that i  i whenever Kj  Kj = 50, as claimed.
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4 Qualitative empirical discussion
This section begins with a discussion of how oil market developments in the run up to late
2014 would have driven a regime switch in light of our comparative-statics results from
Proposition 1. We then give an account of OPECs decision in its November 2014 meeting
to adopt a market-share strategy and its actions since then. Finally, we explain the
subsequent responses of other oil-market players to this regime switch.
4.1 Drivers of regime switch
This section describes the ve developments that favoured OPECs decision to squeeze US
shale (Figure 2), namely (i) weakening demand; strengthening supply from (ii) US shale,
(iii) non-OPEC non-shale sources, and (iv) OPEC, as well as coordination di¢ culties
among OPEC members. An additional factor, which acted against these, is the falling
costs in US shale oil production.
1. Weakening global demand (lower ). Having grown weakly in recent years,
demand growth slowed further from 1.2 million barrels per day (mbd) in 2013 to only
0.9 mbd in 2014, a growth rate of less than 1 percent (Figures 1 and 2). The slowdown
was largely unanticipated. In particular, Q3 2014 actual demand levels were 0.5 mbd
lower than forecast in the International Energy Agencys (IEA) June Monthly Oil Market
Report (MOMR) and Q4 demand levels were almost 0.4 mbd lower than forecast in the
September report. According to Proposition 1, such weakening demand makes switch to
a decision to squeeze more likely.
Demand for oil is structurally restrained by relatively disappointing economic growth
after the Global Financial Crisis. Global GDP grew on average by 313 percent in 2013-
4, which is slower than in previous years and less than had been forecast (IMF, 2012;
2014). In addition, the composition of GDP growth is switching to less energy-intensive
sectors. Further constraints to oil demand include e¢ ciency improvements, fuel switching
to natural gas and biofuels, and environmental restrictions (IEA, 2014; Verleger, 2016).
2. Higher US shale output (higher Kj). Reversing a long period decline since the
early 1980s, US crude oil output rose from about 5 mbd in 2008 to 612 mbd in 2012.
Accelerating output reached about 812 mbd in 2014 and an estimated 9
1
4 mbd in 2015
(Energy Information Administration, 2013, 2015). (Using the slightly broader denition
of oil reported by the IEA, US output reached an estimated 12:8 mbd in 2015.) Almost
all of the increase is attributable to growth in oil extracted from unconventional sources.
Production of light tight oil (LTO), which is one measure of shale production, almost
doubled from 214 mbd in 2012 to 4
1
4 mbd in 2014.
16 Over the two years, this was the
16Alternative proxies yield similar results. Production in the Eagle Ford and Bakken formations alone
doubled to about 2 1
2
mbd, while alternative proxies reported by the World Bank (Ba¤es et al, 2015)
indicate a doubling from 2 mbd to 4 mbd.
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primary source of incremental global supply and itself would have been almost enough to
match growth in global demand (Figure 2).
These realized values repeatedly exceeded forecasts by agencies, indicating a surprise
element. For example, US output in 2014 was 34 mbd higher than anticipated by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) early in its January 2013 Short-term Energy Outlook,
and output for the third quarter of 2014 alone exceeded IEA forecasts for that quarter
made in June 2014 by the same amount. Moreover, forecasts for future output also rose due
to base e¤ects and revised expectations about the pace of technical progress. For example,
EIA estimates for 2019 LTO output were revised upwards by about 34 mbd between the
2014 and 2015 editions of their Annual Energy Outlook (2014, 2015) despite a decline
in prices that had already begun. In terms of our framework, actual and anticipated US
shale production volumes were becoming too large for OPEC to accommodate.
3. Higher non-OPEC non-shale output (higher K`). After accounting for the rise
in US shale, non-OPEC output from other sources also rose. The contribution to global
supply growth was small in 2013, but output rose by 1:4 mbd in 2014 (Figure 2). Although
sources of growth were fairly broad-based, much of the increase came from the Americas,
including Brazil and Canada. Russias oil output was until recently higher than for the
United States, holding steady at 10:9 mbd in 2014. There was also some surprise element
to the non-OPEC non-shale rise; output for Q4 of 2014 was some 0:3 mbd higher than
anticipated by the IEA in September of that year. On the net, the rise in non-OPEC
output made a decision by OPEC to squeeze US shale more likely.
4. Higher OPEC spare capacity (higher Ki). The term call on OPEC crude is
the di¤erence between global oil demand and non-OPEC supply (and OPEC NGLs).17
In 2014, the call declined by 1.8 mbd to 30 mbd, leaving it 1 mbd short of crude output
implying 512 mbd of spare crude capacity. In comparison, spare capacity was only about
3 mbd in 2011. Over the same period, OPECS NGL capacity increased by 12 mbd.
18
In 2011, Libyas conict saw its oil output collapse by two thirds (1 mbd). Libyas
production was restored in 2012, but renewed political and security disruptions once again
cut output by two thirds in 2013-14. Saudi Arabia increased output to o¤set Libyas
disruptions, while other countries including the UAE and Kuwait also decided to raise
output. When Libyas output began to recover, there was no corresponding net decrease
by other members. In fact, Saudi Arabia and other countries increased output further in
2012 and sustained high oil output in subsequent years.
Trends in Iran and Iraq broadly o¤set one another between 2011 and 2014. Iraq con-
tinued to increase its capacity, with 2014 being no exception, to the surprise of many given
that Islamic States territory gains in that country. Although Irans technical capacity may
have remained intact, the US oil embargo imposed binding constraints on Irans ability to
17As mentioned earlier, NGLs are not part of OPECs quota of 30 mbd.
18Further discussion is available in Behar and Pant (2015).
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sell oil. However, the interim deal signed with the so-called p5+1 in August 2013 helped
Irans output stabilize in 2014.19
5. OPEC coordination di¢ culties (lower ). Increased coordination di¢ culties
would make OPEC producers less likely to cooperate to accommodate non-OPEC pro-
ducers in the face of weakening demand. Although OPEC is literally the textbook model
of cartels, there is an extensive literature debating its behavior. OPEC behavior has at
times been characterized as being closer to a fringe of non-cooperative (OPEC and non-
OPEC) producers that is led by Saudi Arabia (Huppmann and Holz, 2012; Huppmann,
2013; Nakov and Nuno, 2013) or a small subset of OPEC members (Bremond, Hache and
Mignon, 2012). Smith (2005) argues that the evidence is that OPEC members are more
cooperative as a cartel that is possibly led by a core group of producers. Almoguera et
al. (2011) conclude OPEC behaves more like (uncooperative) Cournot competitors with
a non-OPEC fringe.20
Structural factors that could contribute to this lack of coordination include di¤erences
in characteristics across members - with those in worse scal situations feeling less able
to cut output and those with more reserves having a longer-term perspective; the absence
of internal compensation or an e¤ective enforcement mechanism; and monitoring costs.
Iraqs formal exemption from the quota following its history of sanctions and OPECs
relatively low global market share by historical standards may have acted to reduce scope
for coordination (Fattouh and Mahadeva, 2013; Huppmann and Holz, 2015).
Huppmann and Holz (2012) nd that OPECs degree of market power declined signif-
icantly in the aftermath of the 2008 nancial crisis, which in our context corresponds to
a drop in . The media has recently reported widening rifts among members, including
increasingly unproductive OPEC meetings. Long accustomed to arriving early at OPECs
two meetings per year to build consensus among members, Saudi Arabias oil minister
reportedly arrived at the last minute to the mid-2014 event, stayed only for a few hours,
and suggested a reduction in meeting frequency to just once a year as he believed there
was little point in talking.21
6. Lower marginal costs for US shale (lower Cj). Cost estimates for US shale vary
considerably due to uncertainties as well as inconsistencies in cost denition.22 Arezki and
Blanchard (2014), citing Rystad Energy, indicate an average breakeven for North American
shale of $62, but have a range of $20 to reect variation across di¤erent US shale plays.
19Libya and Iran were not the only countries to experience supply disruptions. Verleger (2016) that
unanticipated global supply outages rose from 1 mbd to 3mbd after 2011.
20Others have emphasized the dominant role of Saudi Arabia as a swing producer that has targeted a
specic price that balances the trade-o¤ between short-term government funding needs and discouraging
long-term incentives to substitute away from oil before reserves are exhausted (Behar and Pant, 2015;
Cairns and Calfucura, 2012).
21Reported by The Wall Street Journal, 6 October 2014 Rifts in Oil Cartel Set O¤ Price War.
22Ebinger (2014), notes "While various pundits have opined on this question, the truth of the matter
is that no analyst really knows the full range of production costs across the unconventional crude oil
production continuum since this information is highly proprietary."
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They interpret this as the price at which it becomes protable to extract. Ebinger (2014)
indicates a similar range but also distinguishes between costs that include drilling and wells
that have already been completed. Consistent with this, Citi estimates that half-cycle costs
(around $40) could be half as low as full cycle costs.23. Some proprietary estimates include
only the costs of nding and extracting the oil, while others add overheads, transportation,
or a hurdle rate for the cost of capital. Sigonney (2015) presents long term marginal costs
including a 10 percent prot hurdle rate ranging from $40 to $100 as at 2014.
However, it has been widely reported that these costs have been falling, which further
complicates comparability across references. Rostand (2015) calculates that breakevens,
which including nding, development and extraction but exclude overheads, transport, or
the weighted average cost of capital, have declined from $93 in 2009 to $58 in 2013. The
main drivers include technology improvements such as shorter well completion times;24 su-
perior seismic data thanks to software, sensors and lasers; the use of sand, better liquids,
or even microbes for fracking; refracking of wells; and stripping idle rigs for parts (The
Economist, 2015; Brousseau, 2016). These improvements would have acted to discourage
or postpone OPECs decision to try to curtail shale production.
4.2 OPECs actions
As the oil price decline continued in the second half of 2014, many OPEC members 
principally Saudi Arabia and its neighbors repeatedly signaled a regime switch, indicating
they opposed cutting output and intended to defend market share (Middle East Economic
Survey, 2014). Saudi o¢ cials have indicated their belief that shale producerscosts are
high (approaching $100) and Saudi Arabias costs are less than $10, that spare capacity is
high, and that oil prices would not fall far for long (Middle East Economic Survey, 2014).
Moreover, they have said market equilibrium should be restored by reductions in supply
from high cost producers.25
Nonetheless, the OPEC meeting in November 2014 surprised many by the seemingly
collective decision not to reduce its quota to match the demand for its crude, or at least
to reduce actual output to meet the quota. In our framework, this would be consistent
with the formal announcement by OPEC to squeeze US shale production rather than
accommodate it.
In 2015, the call on OPEC remained at 30 mbd, yet OPEC production increased by
1.2 mbd, consistent with pursuit of market share. The biggest contributors were Saudi
Arabia (0.4) mbd and Iraq (0.7) mbd, while no other major OPEC members scaled back
output (Figure 2). OPEC capacity increased by 14 mbd. However, prospects of future
capacity growth were revised up in 2015, acting to re-enforce the decision to squeeze.
23Reported by FTAlphaville 8 October 2014 Its a super market price war! (in oil).
24For example, the time between permit applications and production declined by about 10 percent
between the start of 2012 and 2014 (Currie, 2016).
25Saudi Arabia ... enjoys very low production costs. And we are more e¢ cient than other producers.
It is an advantage we will use, as any producer would...- Saudi Arabias Oil Minister, Mr Al-Naimi (2015:
www.saudiembassy.net/announcement/announcement03041501.aspx).
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In particular, condence in Iraqs ability to continue capacity growth was restored and,
unlike before, this growth would potentially coincide with growth from Iran. In particular,
the nal nuclear deal signed in July 2015 and subsequent actions taken by Iran brought
with it the prospect of rising Iranian capacity in 2016 and beyond including initial supply
from oating storage, in 2016 and beyond. Finally, Indonesia rejoined OPEC in late 2015,
making more capacity available for a coordinated OPEC squeeze.26 Consequently, despite
some scaling back of investments in response to lower oil prices, the IEA (2015, 2016)
increased its estimates of OPEC capacity in 2016 by 34 mbd to 42.6 mbd between the 2015
and 2016 editions of its Medium Term Oil Market Report.
Because of an increase in the number of OPEC members and because much of the
capacity growth is accounted for by traditional political rivals, discord among OPEC
intensied and arguably acted to make a coordinated cut less feasible.
4.3 Market responses
The November 2014 OPEC decision accelerated the oil price decline to about $50 in the
rst quarter of 2015. A subsequent recovery during 2015 proved short-lived, as the excess
supply pressures that had built up in 2014 did not unwind. As a result, oil was cheaper
at the end of 2015 than at the start, and averaged $50 for the year as a whole. Since
that decision, other structural factors have continued to favor pursing market share. In
particular, US and other non-OPEC capacity has continued rising, and global demand has
continued to disappoint. Importantly, OPEC output responded in a way consistent with
the squeeze: it decided to increase output and not decrease it.
US shale supply started showing signs of scaling back. Following the decline in oil
prices, debate shifted to the speed of the US shale supply response. As of early 2015, the
response of shale was hard to determine; some commentators emphasized slowing growth
in output as weakness while others pointed to ongoing rises in levels as strength. There
is empirical evidence that lower oil prices lead to reduced drilling for new wells (Toews
and Naumov, 2016). Rig counts initially gave mixed signals but ended the year some
62 percent lower than at the end of 2014 and at their lowest level since 1999 (Williams,
2016). Yet rig counts can be an imperfect leading indicator of output or output growth.
The number of existing wells being fracked, arguably a better predictor, was still rising
(The Economist, 2016a).
Those expecting resilient production to continue refer to e¢ ciency gains from learning-
by-doing and cost cutting. Rystad Energy Data cited in (The Economist, 2016b) for
selected US shale plays suggests breakeven oil prices declined by about 40 percent between
2013 and 2015,27 and recent corporate lings report cost savings of 25-30 percent per well
26 Indonesias crude output amounts to about 0.7 mbd. To facilitate comparison in the gures and charts
presented in this section, Indonesia is classied as being part of OPEC in all years. In the calibrations
to be preseted in the next section, Indonesia is only part of OPEC in the predicted data for future years
(subsection 5.4).
27The breakevens refer to rig and drilling costs reaching $50, which likely exclude transportation as well
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(IEA, 2016). Others cite oil-price hedging by producers and their ability to secure ongoing
nancing to sustain operations in hope of a price recovery as merely temporary factors
that were delaying the inevitable.28
Nonetheless, in the latter parts of 2015, there were indications that US LTO levels
had peaked in the middle of that year as well as clearer signs of declining output levels
reported in the September 2015 edition of the OMR. This is consistent with US shale
production starting to be squeezed. 2016 LTO output was revised down to about 4 mbd
(EIA, 2015b). At face value, output in 2016 would be substantially lower than its peak
and than in 2014. An alternative measure of the squeeze is a comparison between the
latest available projections and earlier ones before low oil prices had been factored into
projections. 2016 shale output was forecast to be about 5 mbd in early 2015, some 1 mbd
higher than the latest available forecasts.
Non-OPEC non-shale capacity investment was cut drastically. Multinationals
like BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell and Total have responded to the weaker oil price by
laying o¤ workers, cutting investment, and in some cases postponing and canceling some
of their exploration projects (The Economist, 2016a). A widely-cited estimate by Wood
MacKenzie is that close to $400 billion worth of large upstream oil & gas projects have
been put on hold (as of January 2016). Non-OPEC non-shale supply is also expected to
be negatively a¤ected by decreases in Russia due to the recent tightening of sanctions on
that country as well as the lower oil price outlook (IEA, 2015).
However, 2015 saw net growth of an estimated 1:2 mbd. Shells Chief Financial O¢ cer
has reportedly stated that, having already incurred investment costs, the incentive is to
produce as at out as you can(The Economist, 2016a) and that true marginal variable
costs are much lower after factoring in mothballing expenses. Russias production increased
marginally in 2015, but the sources of growth were again Canadian sands and Brazilian
waters. These are both high cost oil sources and by many measures higher than for US
shale. However, the price responses are much slower than is the case for US shale as
the projects entail high upfront capital costs, which have already been incurred, and long
project lifecycles. In other words, the coming months are the long run for many shale
plays and only the short run for other oil resources.29
Demand growth rose as result of the lower oil price. Lower prices contributed
to demand acceleration of 1:6 mbd in 2015 (IEA, 2016). However, this rise is relatively
small considering the oil price decline, suggesting renewed weakness that has acted to
re-enforce the market share strategy. 2015 GDP growth expectations were revised down
as capital and other "xed" costs. For wells that have already been completed The Economist (2016a)
reports a decline in cash costs to below $20.
28Verleger (2016) argues that nancial market innovation has allowed allow disruptive smaller producers
to withstand low prices.
29Non-OPEC capacity forecasts for the next 5 years have been reduced between IEA (2015) and IEA
(2016), reecting some scaling back of investment as well as the exclusion of Indonesia after it rejoined
OPEC.
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to 314 percent, which is lower than every year since 2009. In particular, growth in rela-
tively energy-hungry Emerging Market and Developing Economies including China likely
declined for the fth consecutive year from in 2015 (Oct 2015 WEO). Moreover, demand
growth is expected to slow again to 1.2 mbd in 2016 (IEA, 2016) and structural pressures
on demand could also intensify after the December 2015 Paris Climate Change conference.
5 Quantitative empirical calibration
This section matches the events described above to the model through a combination of
observed data and empirically supported parameter values. We start with two snapshots
(in 2012 and 2014) reecting the period before the oil price crash, conrming that the
model predicts the high oil prices and relatively restrained OPEC production consistent
with an accommodateequilibrium. We proceed to a set of three illustrative scenarios in
which to demonstrate a squeeze. They show in a stylized way how market developments
or a revised calculation by OPEC could induce a change of strategy. Finally, we have two
instances where we apply the model to predicted data for the future to show it generates
a squeeze equilibrium, which in turn predicts higher OPEC supply and low prices in line
with forecasts.
5.1 Calibration approach and data
Actual prices and forecasts (based on futures) are the Average Petroleum Spot Price
(APSP) taken from the IMFs World Economic Outlook database, specically those used
for the January 2016 World Economic Outlook Update.
On the demand side of the model, actual historical or future forecast demand quantities
in millions of barrels per day (mbd) are sourced from various issues of the MOMR and
IEA (2016). A key parameter is , which is chosen so as to ensure demand elasticities that
are consistent with estimates in the literature for a relevant range of observed prices and
quantities. Setting  = 8 implies an elasticity of demand of almost -0.15 when oil prices
are near $100 and around -0.07 when oil prices are at $50. This range falls comfortably
within the connes of empirical work.30 We solve for the demand shift parameter () using
actual demand, actual prices, and  (recall that our demand curve is D(P ) = ( P )=).
Actual historical global supply and inventory changes, which account for discrepancies
with respect to global demand, are also sourced from MOMR issues, as are OPEC and
non-OPEC supply. However, to distinguish US shale production from more conventional
US output, we refer to the Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2015).31 For non-
30Surveys by Atkins and Jayazeri (2004) and Smith (2009) indicate a range of 0 to -0.11. Hamilton
(2009) nds elasticities that are very close to zero, but some more recent studies have found higher demand
responses. Kilian and Murphy (2014) have a preferred estimate of -0.27, and Mohaddes and Pesaran (2015)
o¤er -0.21. Both of these are similar to the median among a time-varying range of elasticities in Baumeister
and Peersman (2013), who themselves nd elasticities have declined over time.
31Specically, we use their data for tight oil in the lower 48 US states. Similar levels or growth rates are
attained using proxies based on individual states or for the main shale oil elds (Ba¤es et al, 2015).
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OPEC supply, capacity is assumed to be equal to actual supply. For OPEC, sustainable
capacity estimates are taken from the IEA (2013,2015,2016). As mentioned earlier, non-
OPEC statistics do not distinguish between crude and NGLs, but OPEC statistics do.
We add NGLs to OPEC crude output/capacity, resulting in volumes that are higher than
more widely reported crude-only volumes.
For supply forecasts, non-OPEC capacity/output is derived from IEA (2016) and shale
capacity is taken from EIA (2015). The IEA does not produce OPEC supply forecasts
but OPEC capacity is taken from IEA (2016).
We set marginal cost for US shale based on the references in section 4.1 as well as
presentations of proprietary information. Although the model is not explicitly dynamic, we
include full-cyclemarginal costs because, as discussed earlier, the full cycle is measured
in months for shale and not years. In contrast, the long-run is much longer for conventional
producers including OPEC, which makes the short-run marginal costs more appropriate.
Numerical values will be indicated in the subsections that follow.
Our parameter for OPECs pricing power  is solved for the value that makes calculated
prices and quantities consistent with the data and other parameters as per equation (2)
which determines OPECs supply behaviour.
5.2 Accommodate examples
We present results for the second quarter of 2014, which included the peak in oil prices,
and an earlier year, 2012, for robustness; these are represented as examples 1A and 1B
in Table 1. Our main nding is that it was then still optimal for OPEC to follow an
accommodate strategy.
In both years, oil prices (P ) were close to $105. Actual demand (D) was 90:7 mbd
in 2012 and 92 mbd in 2014. Setting  = 8 implies a price elasticity of demand of about
 0:15 in both years. Then P , D, and  can be substituted into the demand function to
solve for  for each year. Global supply exceeded demand by 0:2 mbd in 2012 and by 3:4
mbd in the second quarter of 2014, implying large inventory builds. As discussed earlier,
shale capacity (Kj) was 2 mbd in 2012 and 4 mbd in 2014, while OPEC capacity (Ki)
remained constant other non-OPEC capacity (K`) rose.
Marginal costs are set at Ci = $10 for OPEC in both years and and Cj = $90 in 2012
and Cj = $85 for US shale in 2012 and 2014, respectively. As discussed in subsections
4.1 and 5.1, this variable is di¢ cult to pin down, but we choose values towards the top of
the range to represent full cycle costs and allow for a modest cost reduction between 2012
and 2014. We calculate that   13 for both 2012 and Q2 2014. This is broadly consistent
with the OPEC literature discussed earlier, including numerical model simulations and
econometric estimates (Huppmann and Holz, 2012; Almoguera et al., 2011) which implies
that  < 12 .
The tted data conrm that our theory assumptions A1 and A2 hold in both scenarios
1A and 1B. Consistent with A1, US shale oil is viable given that price exceeds its cost. A2
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also holds in both 2012 and 2014, which means that OPEC had su¢ cient spare capacity
to carry out the squeeze strategy.
We nd that the data are consistent with an accommodate equilibrium as per Proposi-
tion 2, so OPEC optimally chose not to pursue the squeeze. In particular, the parameters
and data imply Kj = 3:8 in 2012 while Kj = 5:5 in 2014, which is above actual shale
capacities of Kj = 2 and Kj = 4 in the respective years. Note however that the gap is
already shrinking, so that 2014 is closer to a regime switch than 2012.
The calculated quantity supplied by OPEC under such an equilibrium (denoted in
Table 1 by Si as per (2)) matches the actual data (shown as S in the table after accounting
for unplanned inventory accumulation), while supply under a squeeze equilibrium (denoted
in Table 1 by Si as per (4)) would have been much higher.
5.3 Illustrative squeeze scenarios
Taking 2014 as a starting point, this subsection presents three constructed scenarios where
a squeeze is triggered and US shale output is zero. The rst two separately show how higher
US shale capacity and lower OPEC coordination individually trigger the switch. The
third illustrative scenario combines the rst two of these with lower marginal costs for US
shale and lower global demand, thus capturing four of the ve drivers discussed above, to
generate a squeeze.32
Although stylized, these scenarios show our key point that the regime switch was
optimal for OPEC from an ex ante viewpoint, given the information they may have in-
corporated in deciding how to react to the initial price decline in the 2nd half of 2014.
We in scenario 2A illustrate a case in which all demand and cost parameters (as well as
) are held constant at 2014 levels but allow Kj = 5:5. Although illustrative, we chose this
value because shale output was forecast to reach 5:5mbd in 2018-2024 (EIA, 2015).33 These
forecasts would already imply a capacity in excess of the values of Kj calculated in the
previous two scenarios. This, by construction, triggers a switch to a squeeze equilibrium
with shale output of zero and OPEC supply of 39.7 mbd (Si from equation 4) such that
price is lower (P  = Cj = 85) and global demand is higher. The model assumptions A1
and A2 again hold: shale output would have been positive under the counterfactual of an
accommodation strategy, and OPEC indeed has the capacity required for a squeeze.
Another important development discussed in Section 4 is a decline in , representing
OPECs lower ability to push up prices. In scenario 2B, we again hold all the 2014
parameters constant, including Kj = 4, but now use Proposition 2 to solve for the critical
value of  such that Kj = Kj(). With this value for , US shale capacity of Kj = 4
makes OPEC exactly indi¤erent between the two strategies. The solved value of  = 0.32
is only slightly lower than that in scenario 1B (for which  = 0.36); this implies that a
32Changes in OPEC capacity are only indirectly important for ensuring A1 and A2 hold.
33The rise in (forecast) shale oil capacity can be seen as the latest in a sequence of persistent positive
surprises and upward revisions to forecasts by the EIA. It can also be seen as OPEC having some lag in
incorporating these revisions in its internal calculation of the tradeo¤s.
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small reduction in  is already enough to trigger the decision to squeeze.
The illustrative scenarios so far imply prices well above those observed in late 2014
and early 2015. Our scenario 2C generates a lower price by allowing multiple parameters
to shift in a manner that is qualitatively consistent with Section 4. As discussed earlier,
a number of commentators have pointed to the declining marginal costs of US shale,
especially since oil prices began to fall, so we set Cj = 55 = P .34 Given this lower price,
setting demand to that observed for 2015 implies a sizeable decline in the solved value of 
(relative to 2014), which implies a weakening in global demand. Thus, although lower US
costs discourage the squeeze, the negative demand shift encourages it. Letting US shale
capacity Kj = 5:5, we again use Proposition 2 to nd the value of  for which Kj = Kj()
such that the solved value can be interpreted as the maximum value of  that triggers the
squeeze. OPEC supply Si = 39:4 mbd under the squeeze by (4), which is much closer to
actual supply (38 mbd) than calculated supply under the accommodate equilibrium (Si ).
In summary, scenario (2C) generates a squeeze equilibrium with a more realistic oil
price through higher US shale capacity, lower OPEC pricing power, weaker demand, and
falling production costs. A1 continues to hold, which implies that shale would have been
viable (aided by lower costs but harmed by inter alia weaker demand) had it been accom-
modated. A2 also still holds. In terms of our qualitative discussion from Section 4, this
shows that the various factors favoring a squeeze can quantitatively outweigh lower US
shale costs (which point to accommodation).
5.4 Future squeeze equilibria
This subsection recalibrates the model using forecasts of 2020 oil market data. The rst
retains the notion of all US shale being squeezed out of the market by then. The second
allows for some US shale to remain active. These squeeze equilibria imply that the market-
share strategy can be rationalized economically as a less-badoption for OPEC in the
future, and also yield more plausible forecasts for OPEC output than would be the case
in an accommodate equilibrium.
In equilibrium 3A, the oil price for 2020 of $58 is used to pin down marginal cost for US
shale oil of Cj = $58. By assumption,  is unchanged. The demand shift parameter ()
is solved as before, except this time using third-party forecasts of P and D as described
in subsection 5.1 rather than historical values, and increases by a plausibly moderate
amount between 2014 and 2020. As per Proposition 2, Kj = 5:6 based on EIA (2015) and
so Kj = Kj() when  = 0:21. Equivalently,   0:21 is su¢ cient for a squeeze.
Hence, as per (4), OPEC supply is Si = 41:6 mbd. Under a counterfactual accom-
modate equilibrium as per (2), OPEC supply (Si ) would be about 7 mbd lower, shale
output would equal capacity, and price would be $75 (this is not shown in Table 1). It
can be conrmed that A1 holds, which means that US shale would viably be able to pro-
34This value is only illustrative and was chosen to bring price close to the average observed in 2015.
Nonetheless, it is close to the mid-point of more recent cost estimates and would also imply a decline
broadly in line with some claimed cost reductions since the start of the squeeze.
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duce at capacity in 2020 were it not for OPECs decision to squeeze them out. A2 holds,
which means that OPEC capacity will by then have grown su¢ ciently to expand output
by enough to execute the squeeze.
A less stylized 2020 equilibrium includes non-zero US shale output in a way that reduces
OPEC supply while leaving global supply, prices, and demand unaltered. In particular,
equilibrium 3B relaxes the assumption that US shale is a homogenous group and instead
allows for varying costs such that the futures price of $58 would only squeeze out those
with higher costs. In terms of the model setup, this is equivalent to n being the subset of
US shale capacity consisting of those shale plays with costs above $58.
In particular, setting Kj = 3 and following the same procedure as in equilibrium 3A,35
a squeeze equilibrium would result in OPEC producing 38.6 mbd and US shale producing
2.6 mbd instead of its capacity of 5.6 mbd. We nd that Kj = Kj() = 3 when  = 0:17.
Intuitively, for it to be worth squeezing out about half of US shale oil, the accommodate
equilibrium would have to be even less attractive. Other things equal, this would be
plausible given deteriorating prospects for OPEC coordination.
An interesting implication of this low value of  is that the counterfactual price under
the accommodate equilibrium is now only $5 higher than the squeeze price. In this sense,
US shale oil e¤ectively becomes the price-setter in this future scenario regardless of which
equilibrium is played.
6 Conclusions
The debate on the rationale for and the repercussions of OPECs November 2014 switch to
a market-sharestrategy has drawn considerable attention in energy markets. Many oil-
market analysts and OPEC itself viewed the decision as a battle of OPEC vs shale
aimed at squeezing higher-cost US players out of the market. We have contributed to
this debate with an equilibrium model that helps understand how fundamental market
developments can rationalize OPECs regime switch as a prot-maximizing strategy. Such
a shift can explain why OPEC supply can optimally rise in response to US shale growth
or weaker global demand and induce an oil price collapse.
Our calibration of the model shows it was better for OPEC to accommodate expand-
ing US shale production up to 2014 despite having the spare capacity to squeeze them
out of the market. Stylized comparative statics show how plausible updates to OPECs
information set prompted a switch to a market-share strategy in late 2014. Calibration
to forecasts of future market data shows how evolving developments can sustain a regime
switch to a squeeze. Through the lens of the model, the market-share strategy can be the
better of the two options given US shale capacity, OPEC coordination prospects, weak
global oil demand, and other market factors.
It remains to be seen whether the initial logic of the squeeze will play out and vindicate
35This choice of Kj = 3 is in line with proprietary estimates of values by shale oil eld and with the
median and range published by Arezki and Blanchard (2014).
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the OPEC strategy in the coming years. As of early 2016, the squeeze appears to have
been less successful than OPEC might have calculated: a substantial decline in US shale
output does not (yet) appear imminent, and the squeeze has perhaps provided more costly
than anticipated given the continued decline in oil prices (IEA, 2016). One potential reason
is that the costs of US shale have fallen more strongly than might have been anticipated.
In terms of our framework, this could prompt a further OPEC regime switch back to
accommodate. It is also possible that the attempted squeeze and the re-entry of Iran have
made coordinated accommodation so problematic that OPEC reluctantly yet rationally
persists with the squeeze. This paper has not pretended to forecast the future of the
industry but rather to provide a coherent economic framework to think about the key
drivers of such regime switches, including the one that took place at the end of 2014.
Finally, while we have focused on the oil market, we note that our approach can also be
applied to understand competition in other energy-intensive sectors. For example, natural
gas is also characterized by signicant supply-side concentration. In the EU, Gazprom
plays a dominant role in the sense that it accounts for around 30% of gas imports. It
competes against domestic supplies in some EU countries, other pipeline exporters, and
liqueed natural gas (LNG) which likely all have higher production costs. Recent gas
policy discussions suggest that the demand slowdown and likely future competition from
US shale gas arriving in Europe as LNG mean that Gazprom should begin a price war
to regain market share and squeeze higher-cost LNG players (and possibly coal produc-
tion) out of the European market (Henderson 2016). This regime choice has some close
parallels with the oil-market setting, and our model could similarly be used to quantify
the conditions under which a market-share strategy becomes optimal for Gazprom.
References
[1] Almoguera, Pedro A. Christopher C. Douglas, and Ana Maria Herrera (2011). Test-
ing for the cartel in OPEC: Non-cooperative collusion or just non-cooperative?Ox-
ford Review of Economic Policy, 27(1):144168
[2] Andrade de Sa, Saraly and Julien Daubanes (2014). Limit Pricing and the
(In)E¤ectiveness of a the Carbon Tax.Working Paper at ETH Zurich, November
2014.
[3] Arezki, Rabah and Olivier Blanchard (2014), Seven Questions About The Recent
Oil Price Slump. iMFdirect blog. Posted 22 December 2014.
[4] Atkins, Frank and Tayyebi Jazayeri (2004), A Literature Review of Demand Studies
in World Oil Markets. University of Calgary Department of Economics Discussion
Paper, 2004-07.
22
[5] Ba¤es, John, M. Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Marc Stocker. The Great
Plunge in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses. Development
Economics Group Research Note, PRN/15/01. World Bank.
[6] Baumeister, Christiane and Lutz Kilian (2015). Understanding the Decline in the
Price of Oil Since June 2014. CEPR Discussion Paper, 10404
[7] Baumeister, Christiane and Gert Peersman (2013). The Role of Time-varying Price
Elasticities in Accounting for Volatility Changes in the Crude Oil Market. Journal
of Applied Econometrics, 28:1087-1109
[8] Behar, Alberto and Malika Pant (2015). Outlook for the Global Oil Market and
Implications for Saudi Arabia, In Ahmed Al-Darwish, Naif Alghaith, Alberto Be-
har, Tim Callen, Pragyan Deb, Amgad Hegazy, Padamja Khandelwal, Malika Pant,
and Haonan Qu, Saudi Arabia: Tackling Emerging Economic Challenges to Sustain
Growth. International Monetary Fund Middle East and Central Asia Department.
Washington, DC.
[9] Beidas-Strom, Samya and Carolina Osorio-Buitron (2015). The Oil Price Collapse:
Demand or Supply?. Uneven Growth: Short- and Long-Term Factors, World Eco-
nomic Outlook, April 2015. International Monetary Fund. Washington, DC.
[10] Bremond, Vincent, Emmanuel Hache and Valerie Mignon (2012). Does OPEC still
exist as a cartel? An empirical investigation. Energy Economics, 34:125-131.
[11] Brusseau, Alain (2016). Oil Market Developments. Mimeograph. International Mon-
etary Fund. 3 February
[12] Cairns, Robert and Enrique Calfucura (2012). OPEC: Market failure or power fail-
ure?. Energy Policy, 50 : 570-580.
[13] Ebinger, Charles (2014), World Oil Demand: And Then There Was None. Brookings
PlanetPolicy. Posted 17 October 2014.
[14] Energy Information Administration (2014). Annual Energy Outlook 2014. Washing-
ton, DC.
[15] Energy Information Administration (2015). Annual Energy Outlook 2015. Washing-
ton, DC.
[16] Energy Information Administration (2015b). Short-term Energy Outlook, September
2015. Washington, DC.
[17] Fattouh, Bassam and Lavan Mahadeva (2013). OPEC: What Di¤erence Has It
Made?. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 5:427-443
23
[18] Fattouh, Bassam, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Anupama Sen (2015). The Dynamics
of the Revenue Maximization - Market Share Trade-o¤: Saudi Arabias Oil Policy in
the 2014-2015 Price Fall. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Working Paper, WPM
61.
[19] Hamilton, James D. (2009). Understanding crude oil prices.The Energy Journal,
30(2): 179206
[20] Hamilton, James D. (2015). Demand factors in the collapse of oil prices." Econ-
browser blog, posted 11 January 2015.
[21] Henderson, James (2016). Gazprom Is 2016 the Year for a Change of Pricing Strat-
egy in Europe? Working Paper at Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, January 2016.
[22] Huppmann, Daniel (2013). Endogenous Shifts in OPEC Market Power: A Stackelberg
Oligopoly with Fringe. Working Paper at DIW Berlin, July 2013.
[23] Huppmann, Daniel and Franziska Holz (2012). Crude oil market power: A shift in
recent years? The Energy Journal, 33(4):12
[24] Huppmann, Daniel and Franziska Holz (2015). What about the OPEC Cartel? DIW
Roundup: Politik im Fokus, 58.
[25] Hussain, Aasim, Rabah Arezki, Peter Breuer, Vikram Hassar, Thomas Helbling,
Paulo Medas, Martin Sommer, and an IMF Sta¤Team (2015). Global Implications of
Lower Oil Prices. International Monetary Fund Sta¤ Discussion Note, SDN/15/15.
[26] International Energy Agency (2013). Medium-term Oil Market Report, 2013. Paris.
[27] International Energy Agency (2014). Medium-term Oil Market Report, 2014. Paris.
[28] International Energy Agency (2015). Medium-term Oil Market Report, 2015. Paris.
[29] International Energy Agency (2016). Medium-term Oil Market Report, 2016. Paris.
[30] International Monetary Fund (2012). Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth,
World Economic Outlook, October 2012. Washington, DC
[31] International Monetary Fund (2014). Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, World Eco-
nomic Outlook, October 2014. Washington, DC
[32] Killian, Lutz and Daniel Murphy (2014). The Role of Inventories and Specula-
tive Trading in the Global Market for Crude Oil. Journal of Applied Econometrics,
29:454-478.
[33] Middle East Economic Survey (2014). Saudi Sees $90/B Crude As Price Floor. 3
October 2014.
24
[34] Mabro, Robert (1998). The Oil Price Crisis of 1998. Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, SP 10.
[35] Mohaddes, Kamiar and M. Hashem Pesaran (2015). Country-Specic Oil Supply
Shocks and the Global Economy: A Counterfactual Analysis. Cambridge EPRG
Working Paper, 1512.
[36] Mohaddes, Kamiar and Mehdi Raissi (2016). The U.S. Oil Supply Revolution and
the Global Economy. Cambridge EPRG Working Paper, 1604.
[37] Nakov, Anton and Galo Nuno (2013). Saudi Arabia and the Oil Market. Economic
Journal 123, 1333-1362.
[38] Rostand, Antoine (2015). What Future Evolution for US Light Tight Oil?. Schlum-
berger Presentation, World Policy Conference, 21 November 2015.
[39] Sigonney, Pierre (2015). International Oil Companies in the Evolving Energy Land-
scape. Total Presentation, World Policy Conference, 21 November 2015.
[40] Smith, James (2005) Inscrutable OPEC: Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis,
The Energy Journal 26(1), 5182.
[41] Smith, James (2009). World Oil: Market or Mayhem?. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives (vol. 23, no. 3, 2009).
[42] The Economist (2015). The oil industry: After OPEC. 16 May 2015.
[43] The Economist (2016a). Oil Conundrum. 23 January 2016.
[44] The Economist (2016b). DUC and cover. 12 March 2016.
[45] Tirole, Jean (1988). The Theory of Industrial Organization. MIT Press.
[46] Toews, Gerhard and Alexander Naumov (2016). The Relationship Between Oil Price
and Costs in the Oil Industry. The Energy Journal 36, 237254.
[47] Verleger, Philip K. Jr. (2016). Structure Matters: Oil Markets Enter the Adelman
Era. The Energy Journal 36, 129157.
[48] Williams, James (2016). North America Rotary Rig Counts. WTRG Economics. 5
January 2016.
[49] Yergin, Daniel (2008). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power. Free
Press. New York.
25
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (3) and (5), the di¤erence in OPEC prots i 
(i  i ) between the two strategies equals
i =
1

"
[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci)  

(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)
(1 + )
2#
. (6)
For the comparative statics of (i) to (v), in turn, di¤erentiation shows that
@
@Kj
(i) =
2
(1 + )2
[(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)] > 0
is implied by A1, and
@
@
(i) =   1


(1  )
(1 + )3
[(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)]2

< 0
holds whenever  < 1, and
@
@
(i) =
1


(Cj   Ci)  2
(1 + )2
[(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)]

< 0
also holds since (Cj  Ci) < (1+) [(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)] is A1 and 2(1+)2  (1+) since
 2 (0; 1], and
@
@Cj
(i) =
1

[[(  Cj)  K`]  (Cj   Ci)] > 0
holds by A1, and nally
@
@K`
(i) =  (Cj   Ci) + 2
(1 + )2
[(  Ci)  (Kj +K`)] > 0
also holds as a consequence of A1, thus proving parts (i)(v).
Proof of Proposition 2. This expression for the di¤erence in prots from (6) can easily
be rearranged to obtain the condition that
i(; ; ; Ci; Cj ;Kj ;K`) > 0 () Kj > Kj ,
where Kj is dened in the proposition. Plugging the critical value Kj into (1) yields:
P (Kj) =
Ci + [  (  Ci) + (1 + )
q
1
 [(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci)]
(1 + )
= Ci +
r
1

[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci) ,
as claimed. It remains to check that the condition for the regime switch is itself compatible
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with A1. To do so, rewrite A1 as
Kj <

1


(  Ci)  (1 + )

(Cj   Ci)

 K`

 bKj ,
so we require that Kj < bKj . Performing the calculations shows that:
Kj < bKj ()
(  Ci)  (1 + )
r
1

[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci) < (  Ci)  (1 + )

(Cj   Ci) ()
1

(Cj   Ci) <
r
1

[(  Cj)  K`] (Cj   Ci) ()
(Cj   Ci) <  [(  Cj)  K`]
where the last expression holds by A1, thus completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. For part (i), since the price is lower under the squeeze strategy,
P  < P  by Proposition 2, market demand is higher, D(P ) > D(P ) because demand
is downward-sloping. Since production from non-OPEC ex-US players K` is unchanged,
it follows that OPECs production must also be higher, that is, Si  fD(P ) K`g >
fD(P ) Kj  K`g  Si .
For part (ii), using the previous expressions for is demand from (1) for 0 and (2) for 00
shows that Si (
00) > Si (
0) is equivalent to:
(00   Cj)

 K` > [
0   (Kj +K`)  Ci]
(1 + )
()
[00   Cj   K`] + Kj > (0   00) + (Cj   Ci) ()
[(00   Cj)  (Kj +K`)]  (Cj   Ci)
	
+ (1 + )Kj > (
0   00)  
as claimed, and recalling that f[(00   Cj)  (Kj +K`)]  (Cj   Ci)g > 0 is A1.
Appendix B: Data sources
Oil prices (historical and assumed): IMF World Economic Outlook database (January
2016 World Economic Outlook Update vintage)
Demand volumes (historical and forecast): International Energy Agency Medium Term
Oil Market Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues)
Demand parameters:  = 8, in line with existing empirical work;  solved for using P , D,
and 
Global supply volumes; inventory changes (realized): International Energy Agency Medium
Term Oil Market Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues)
OPEC supply volumes (historical): International Energy Agency Medium Term Oil Market
Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous issues).
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OPEC supply volumes (forecast): solved endogenously.
OPEC capacity (historical and forecast): International Energy Agency Medium Term Oil
Market Report (2015, 2016).
US shale capacity/supply (realized and forecast): Energy Information Administration (2015).
Non-OPEC non-shale capacity/supply (realized and forecast): International Energy Agency
Medium Term Oil Market Report (2015, 2016) and Monthly Oil Market Report (numerous
issues).
US shale marginal cost : In line with industry reports; equal to oil price forecasts (squeeze).
OPEC marginal cost : As per industry reports.
OPEC coordination power : determined endogenously.
28
29
